Action learning versus strategy learning

This article seeks to ascertain whether the strategy‐learning model of Hanaki, Sethi, Erev, and Peterhansl (2003) better accounts for observed behavior than do the various action‐learning models. It does so by measuring the goodness‐of‐fit of the models' predictions against published experimental results for such games as Coordination, Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chicken. The fit is measured via the mean squared deviation (MSD) between the observed behavior and the one predicted by the model. The results show that, for Chicken, the strategy‐learning model fits the observed data much better than do the action‐learning models. The best action‐learning model, on the other hand, fits the observed data well in Coordination. Overall, the strength of the strategy‐learning model is best shown in games where alternations between the two stage‐game Nash equilibria are often observed in the laboratory experiments. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 9: 41–50, 2004     

小型企业规模的有效性分析

在当代企业纷纷追求规模的不断扩大的同时，统计数据却显示企业平均规模不断下降的事实趋势。论根据数学、经济学与博弈论的有关理论对企业规模小型化的内在要求进行了探讨，分析的结论一致证明：粘型化规模在当代经济环境中是充分有效的。     

基于演化博弈的武器装备研制合同定价模型研究

针对合同的动态性，提出利用基于演化博弈建立定价模型。考虑到决策群体中个体的认识误差，对所建立的定价模型进行修正，建立带偏离的定价模型并分析了偏离对均衡解的影响。最后将以上模型应用实例进行比较分析。     

基于模糊方法的多人合作对策的研究

多人合作对策模型中联盟的收入和总体的收入常常出现相互矛盾的情况 ,此时核是空集 .由于不存在核 ,无法用 Nash-Harsanyi谈判模型求解 .采用模糊数学方法 ,调整模型中线性约束的右端系数 ,使核在一定程度上是非空集合 ,得到模糊意义下的 Nash平衡解 .该方法一定程度上解决了各联盟收入与总体收入的矛盾 .最后通过一个算例说明该方法的可行性 .     

市场竞争与国有企业所有权安排

改进了张维迎对地区间竞争与国有企业民营化的分析,给出了经营者的剩余索取份额对竞争性的连续依赖关系:国有企业若要降低成本,就必须参与市场竞争,随着市场竞争的加强,国有企业经营者的剩余索取份额应该逐渐增大,而当市场竞争水平超过某一阈值,国有企业经营者拥有全部剩余索取权是最优的.     

Cooperative games of choosing partners and forming coalitions in the marketplace

Two games of interacting between a coalition of players in a marketplace and the residual players acting there are discussed, along with two approaches to fair imputation of gains of coalitions in cooperative games that are based on the concepts of the Shapley vector and core of a cooperative game. In the first game, which is an antagonistic one, the residual players try to minimize the coalition's gain, whereas in the second game, which is a noncooperative one, they try to maximize their own gain as a coalition. A meaningful interpretation of possible relations between gains and Nash equilibrium strategies in both games considered as those played between a coalition of firms and its surrounding in a particular marketplace in the framework of two classes of n-person games is presented. A particular class of games of choosing partners and forming coalitions in which models of firms operating in the marketplace are those with linear constraints and utility functions being sums of linear and bilinear functions of two corresponding vector arguments is analyzed, and a set of maximin problems on polyhedral sets of connected strategies which the problem of choosing a coalition for a particular firm is reducible to are formulated based on the firm models of the considered kind.     

Winning controllers and regions in competitive nonlinear dynamic games with two qualitative objectives and uncertain information

The Liapunov technique has been introduced in differential games in a sequence of works over the last decade. We discuss application of this technique to the interface between two competitive semi-games, each with different qualitative objective. The feedback information for controllers is provided from designed, analytically integrable state predictors with reduced dynamics, which considerably shortens the computing time. The case is illustrated on the scenario of target reaching before being intercepted, and intercepting before target is reached.Deceased.     

An Informational Approach to the Sinusoidal Law of Photon Polarization

The photon polarization law po ＝ sin2θ is derived from a simple informational consideration by twomethods: The first is via an intuitive principle of mininum Fisher information, the second is via a symmetry andinvariance argument. The results demonstrate that in photon polarization, Nature has a tendency to hide herselfas deepas possible while obeying some regular conditions.     

共同治理结构下企业所有权配置的进化博弈分析

本文运用进化博弈论的方法,对有限理性的利益相关者在共同治理结构下参与企业所有权配置并达到纳什均衡的进化博弈过程进行分析,并通过算例说明了这是一个各方相互沟通和反复博弈的动态过程,逐步实现一致性的企业所有权配置的纳什均衡.     

On a dynamic fractional game

Consider a two-person zero-sum game constructed by a dynamic fractional form. We establish the upper value as well as the lower value of a dynamic fractional game, and prove that the dual gap is equal to zero under certain conditions. It is also established that the saddle point function exists in the fractional game system under certain conditions so that the equilibrium point exists in this game system.